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“The culture of leaks has to change”1, but at what expense to 
congressional oversight of the Executive Branch? An 
examination of Title V. of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2013. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Government officials, including members of Congress, 
communicate with members of the media regarding sensitive 
material on a daily basis.2  Subsequently, this information 
often reaches the public through various media channels,3 
helping the public sort out critical issues, which is a core 
feature of our democracy.4 
A recent example demonstrates just how important this 
system is: in April 2012, a year after the killing of Osama bin 
Laden, intelligence officials briefed journalists regarding the 
future threats al-Qaeda posed to the United States.5  Armed 
with this knowledge, the public was able to stay informed 
about related governmental policies.  Due to a recent rise in 
unauthorized leaks, the Senate Intelligence Committee 
proposed and approved an amendment to the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.6  These provisions, 
which aim to disrupt the flow of classified information to the 
press and public, would severely infringe upon the media’s 
relationship with the government, and in turn, the people.  If 
provisions of this magnitude are enacted, information such as 
the recent assessment of al-Qaeda would never reach the 
public, leading to a number of unintended consequences.  
After considerable congressional debate and public 
criticism, however, the anti-leak provisions were removed 
from the bill.7  While these provisions ultimately failed, the 
 
 2.  Editorial, A Bill to Stop Security Leaks Puts a Plug on Democracy, WASH. POST 
(July 30, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/squelching-public-interest-in-
national-security/2012/07/30/gJQAF0pHLX_story.html. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, S. 3454, 112th Cong. §§ 
501-511 (2012) (as reported by S. Comm. on Intelligence, July 30, 2012); see also Press 
Release, U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Feinstein, Chambliss Announce 
Committee Approval of Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Authorization (July 25, 2012), 
available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=337333. 
 7.  See infra note 152. 
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problem of leaks persists.8  It remains extremely likely that 
new legislation will be crafted and proposed to combat this 
issue in the near future.9 
This Comment will argue that legislation, namely, Title V 
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, 
would negatively impact the system of congressional oversight 
by prohibiting members of Congress from talking to the media 
about intelligence activities.  Congress uses the media as a 
way to exercise its constitutionally implied duty of oversight 
of the Executive Branch.  Title V would therefore limit 
Congress’s ability to monitor the conduct of intelligence 
agencies and ultimately pose a great risk to the checks and 
balances of government and the national security of the 
United States. 
Part I will discuss intelligence leaks and congressional 
oversight with respect to the media.  Part II will provide an 
overview of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2013 and its relevant provisions.  Part III will discuss the 
recent backlash from various groups and media outlets 
concerning the Act.  Part IV will outline the Act’s legal and 
policy implications for Congress, the media, and the public.  
Finally, Part V will argue that Congress should not adopt 
legislation of this nature. 
I: INTELLIGENCE LEAKS AND CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT WITH 
RESPECT TO THE MEDIA 
A. Unauthorized and Authorized Disclosures 
Most discussions about intelligence leaks revolve around 
the government regulating the flow of national security 
information.10  This is because the government has a 
substantial interest in protecting the national security of the 
country.11  As such, the “executive and legislative branches of 
government have elaborate machinery for protecting the 
confidentiality of information used in policymaking and 
 
 8.  See infra text accompanying notes 148-149. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Alan Katz, Government Information Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CAL. 
L. REV. 108, 109 (1976). 
 11.  Id.  
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administration.”12 
A leak by a government employee is considered “the 
release, outside official public information channels, of 
previously undisclosed government information.”13  Leaks can 
be classified as either authorized or unauthorized.14  An 
authorized leak is defined as “an established part of 
government policy,”15 while an unauthorized leak is said to 
“[occur] when a government employee makes public 
information that her superiors and the government 
information machinery have chosen not to disclose.”16  
Whether a leak is authorized or unauthorized, those that are 
disseminated by the media are an important source of 
political news and are likewise an effective means of 
influencing government policy.17  This Comment will focus in 
particular on the consequences of unauthorized leaks. 
In 2009, former Director of National Intelligence, Dennis 
Blair, wrote a memorandum to the directors of the sixteen 
United States Intelligence Community Agencies,18 discussing 
the severe consequences posed by the unauthorized disclosure 
of classified information.19  He noted that “disclosures of 
classified information, including ‘leaks’ to the media can 
compromise sensitive sources and methods . . . and may allow 
our adversaries to learn about, deny, counteract, and deceive 
our intelligence collection methods, leading to the loss of 
critical capabilities, resources, and even lives.”20  Blair further 
noted that over recent years, unauthorized disclosures have 
impaired the ability of the Intelligence Community to 
accomplish its mission and support its national security 
objectives.21 
 
 12.  Id. at 108. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Katz, supra note 10, at 109. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  GARY ROSS, WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN? THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 5 (NI Press ed., 2011), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/ross.pdf.  
 19.  Id. at 5-6. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
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B. Congressional Oversight of the Executive Branch 
While these unauthorized disclosures have the potential to 
jeopardize national security, Congress also utilizes the media 
to exercise oversight of the Executive Branch.  Among 
Congress’s responsibilities are creating legislation, 
appropriating funds for Executive Branch operations, and 
monitoring whether the Executive Branch carries out its 
responsibilities effectively and in accordance with the law.22  
This type of monitoring of the Executive Branch is also 
referred to as congressional oversight.23  The Congressional 
Research Service defines congressional oversight as “the 
review, monitoring, and supervision of the implementation of 
public policy – of the Executive Branch,”24 and this duty of 
oversight is embodied in Congress’s implied powers under the 
Constitution.25  Congress oversees the Executive Branch 
through a wide variety of channels, organizations, and 
structures.26  Oversight techniques range from investigation 
and reporting requirements to more contemporary means,27 
such as utilizing media outlets.28  Thus, “members of 
Congress, as the elected representatives of the American 
people, [have] the obligation to be the eyes and ears of the 
citizenry by closely watching over the policies of the President 
and executive officials.”29  This holds true for policies dealing 
with intelligence and national security where the President is 
the “sole organ for the Nation in foreign affairs . . . carrying 
with it preeminent authority in [these two policy areas].”30 
 
 22.  Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 2011 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 915 (2011). 
 23.  FREDERICK M. KAISER, WALTER J. OLESZEK & TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL 30240, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL 1 (2011), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  See infra text accompanying note 34; see also Letter from ACLU to U.S. Senate 
(Aug. 15, 2012) (on file with author), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/8-15-
12_-_aclu_on_s_3454_title_v_-_final.pdf. 
 29.  Vicki Divoll, President Obama’s First Two Years: A Legal Reflection: The “Full 
Access Doctrine”: Congress’s Constitutional Entitlement to National Security 
Information from the Executive, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 500 (2011). 
 30.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 2 (2006), available at 
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Because the Executive Branch is traditionally responsible 
for intelligence and national security,31 it often uses its 
authority to limit the distribution of such information to the 
other branches of government.32  Some information, however, 
must be delivered to the Legislative Branch not only to help 
protect national security, but also to monitor the Executive 
Branch as a part of the system of separation of powers.33  
Because the Executive Branch is able to select what 
intelligence and national security information makes its way 
to the Legislative Branch, Congress often utilizes means, such 
as the media, to exercise its oversight function.34 
Congress empowers the media with information it receives 
to help moderate Executive Branch policies and activities that 
require close scrutiny.35  With this information, the media 
attempts to influence executive behavior.36  This relationship, 
however, is not one sided. The media also equips Congress 
with information it may need in order to perform its own job, 
creating a symbiotic relationship37 whereby Congress has a 
chief ally in the mass media.38  If the Executive Branch 
deprives Congress of access to this to information, the public 
is in turn disposed of their power under the Constitution to 
ensure that the Executive Branch is not abusing its powers or 
using those powers poorly,39 and the system of checks and 
balances is then disrupted.40  What has further set this 
balance out of kilter has been the increase in executive power 
 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf; see also FREDERICK A. 
O. SCHWARTZ, JR. ET AL. UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A 
TIME OF TERROR, 1 (2007). 
 31.  Louis Fisher, Presidential Power in National Security: A Guide to the 
President-Elect, THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSITION PROJECT (2007), 
http://loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/presidential-power-national-security.pdf. 
 32.  Clark, supra note 22, at 930-931. 
 33.  Id.  
 34.  See supra text accompanying note 28. 
 35.  Clark, supra note 22, at 915. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Murrey Marder, The Press and the Presidency: Silencing the Watchdog, 
NIEMAN WATCHDOG (Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm? 
fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=240; see also Mary-Rose Papandrea, 
Article, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security 
Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 256 (2008). 
 38.  Clark, supra note 22, at 915. 
 39.  Divoll, supra note 29, at 493.  
 40.  Id. 
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and privilege since the September 11th attacks. 
C. Increase in Executive Power and Privilege Since September 
11th 
There has been a steadily increasing trend in executive 
power and the September 11th terrorist attacks have only 
accelerated this growth.41  For over a decade, the Executive 
Branch has operated on a “need to know” basis where certain 
information is safely protected and sparingly distributed.42  
Congress has gradually found it more difficult to obtain 
information about how the Executive Branch exercises its 
power in various policymaking areas, specifically that of 
national security.43 
Executive privilege represents the President’s ability to 
withhold certain information sought by Congress.44  
Operating in a perfect system, this privilege would allow the 
President to seek candid advice from his advisors while still 
permitting Congress to obtain just enough information for it 
to perform its oversight function.45  However, no system is 
perfect; in fact, executive privilege has recently limited 
Congress’s oversight function by denying it access to 
necessary information.46  The President typically acts with 
little deference to or collaboration with Congress on matters 
relevant to national security.47  History shows that executive 
power is not necessarily benign,48 and that this newly 
expanded executive privilege has actually aided in tipping the 
 
 41.  EMILY BERMAN, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A LEGISLATIVE REMEDY 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/ 
Executive.Privilege.pdf. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 2. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 1. 
 48.  BERMAN, supra note 41, at 1. In her paper, Ms. Berman states that: (“When 
presidents are allowed to implement policies that have not been subject to scrutiny, the 
results have included justifying abusive interrogation and detention policies through 
flawed legal analysis; manipulating prosecutorial decision-making for partisan ends; 
engaging in unlawful conspiracies to influence the outcome of elections; unlawfully 
funding foreign paramilitary groups; and conducting unlawful surveillance of 
Americans.”) 
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constitutional balance of power.49 
The framers of the Constitution created a system of checks 
and balances to act as “a self-executing safeguard against the 
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the 
expense of the other.”50  This system relies on transparency51 
and “when secrecy thwarts the efforts of the people and their 
elected representatives to obtain information, it undermines 
Congress’s core functions, its ability to enact legislation and 
exercise oversight.”52 
Therefore, the main problem with the rise of executive 
power and privilege is that it limits Congress’s oversight of 
the Executive Branch.  To begin with, Congress has limited 
tools available to it to perform its oversight function.53  Even 
when Congress does succeed in obtaining the information it 
seeks, it is often the case that too much time has passed for 
such information to serve a useful purpose.54  To take away 
one of Congress’s primary means of oversight – the media – 
would exacerbate this problem. 
More importantly, Congress’s need for information on 
national security issues is greater than its need for 
information in other policymaking areas.55  Because this 
information is well guarded, the public depends on Congress 
to scrutinize national security policies to ensure that the 
government is not infringing on any of its rights.56  The 
history of leaks, as discussed in the following section, shows 
just how vulnerable this area of policymaking is.57 
D. Historical National Security Leaks in the Media 
Since the founding of the United States, leaks have played 
an important role in the country’s governance.58  Nearly every 
 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 51.  BERMAN, supra note 41, at 1. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 3. 
 54.  Id. at 9. 
 55.  Id. at 15. 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  See discussion infra Part I D.   
 58.  Micha Zenko, A Brief History of National Security Links, POLITICS, POWER, 
AND PREVENTATIVE ACTION (June 8, 2012), http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/06/08/a-brief-
history-of-national-security-leaks/. 
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administration is linked to leaking some type of national 
security information,59 beginning with the first President of 
the United States, George Washington.60  One of the first 
significant leaks that occurred during Washington’s 
administration was when John Jay returned from Great 
Britain in 1795 with a treaty intended to end ongoing 
disputes carried forward from the American Revolution.61  
Washington, however, did not want the contents of the treaty 
disclosed to the public until it was first reviewed by the 
Federalist Senate.62  Despite Washington’s wishes, an Anti-
Federalist newspaper acquired the entire text of the treaty 
and decided to publish it.63 
Other leaks of classified information throughout following 
administrations have included the details of the Iran-Contra 
Affair;64 the Plame Affair;65 the government’s radiation and 
biological weapon experiments on unwitting Americans;66 the 
effectiveness of weapons systems;67 human rights abuses in 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa;68 and many other illegally or 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Papandrea, supra note 37, at 249. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  John R. McGeehan, THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, NETPLACES, 
http://www.netplaces.com/american-history/new-conservatism/the-iran-contra-
affair.htm (“In November 1986, word leaked to newspapers in November 1986 that the 
United States had secretly sold weapons to Iran.”). 
 65.  Tanya N. Ballard & Kevin Dumouchelle, Key Players in the Plame Affair, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2005, 5:02PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/20/AR2005102001487.html (“A July 14, 2003, newspaper 
column by Robert D. Novak sparked a two-year investigation into whether White House 
officials illegally leaked the identity of a covert CIA operative [Valerie Plume] in 
retaliation for public criticisms made by the operative’s husband [Joseph C. Wilson] 
about the Bush administration’s case for invading Iraq.”). 
 66.  U.S. Promises to Release Data on Plutonium Test, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/21/us/us-promises-to-release-data-on-plutonium-
test.html (discussing that 18 patients were injected with plutonium during secret 
experiments in the 1940s). 
 67.  Eric Schmitt, Israel Plays Down Effectiveness of Patriot Missile, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 31, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/31/world/israel-plays-down-
effectiveness-of-patriot-missile.html (“Senior Israel scientists and military officers 
disclosed new information indicating that the American Patriot missiles used in Israel 
in the Persian Gulf war destroyed far fewer Scud missile warheads that previously 
believed.”). 
 68.  See Raymond Bonner, News Organizations Ask White House to Veto Secrecy 
Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/01/us/news-
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morally reprehensive government practices.69  Moreover, some 
leaks have dealt with the exposure of questionable and 
potentially illegal practices, including the treatment of 
prisoners in Abu Ghraib70 and Guantanamo Bay;71 
wiretapping outside of the provisions of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); and extraordinary 
rendition.72  The nature and content of leaks has varied 
greatly since the founding of the United States, which will be 
demonstrated in the following section’s discussion of the 
country’s most recent national security leaks. 
E. Recent National Security Leaks in the Media 
Some media reports claim that the leaks of the Obama 
administration are “greater in magnitude and sensitivity than 
those of previous administrations.”73  President Obama, 
addressing the alleged leaks that occurred during his 
administration, stated in his remarks at a press conference in 
June 2012: 
We’re dealing with issues that can touch on the safety and security 
of the American people, our families, or our military personnel, or 
our allies.  And so we don’t play with that.  And it is a source of 
consistent frustration, not just for my administration but for 
previous administrations, when this stuff happens.74 
Of the recent leaks in the United States, the more 
important ones75 have been Stuxnet,76 a classified cyber-
 
organizations-ask-white-house-to-veto-secrecy-measure.html. 
 69.  Papandrea, supra note 37, at 254-255.  
 70.  James Risen, G.I.’s Are Accused of Abusing Iraqi Captives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
29, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/29/politics/29ABUS.html (“American 
soldiers at a prison outside Baghdad have been accused of forcing Iraqi prisoners into 
acts of sexual humiliation and other abuses in order to make them talk.”). 
 71.  See Dana Priest & Joe Stephens, Pentagon Approved Tougher Interrogations, 
WASH. POST (May 9, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2004/05/09/AR2005040206867.html. 
 72.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Leaks Show Secrecy Overused, NEWS OBSERVER (July 30, 
2010), http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/07/30/603536/leak-shows-secrecy-
overused.html. 
 73.  Elise Cooper, Political Leaks, AMERICAN THINKER BLOG (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/10/political_leaks.html. 
 74.  Remarks by the President (June 8, 2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/08/remarks-president.  
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Kim Zetter, Sen. Feinstein Calls for Hearing on Stuxnet Leaks as FBI Begins 
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attack program aimed at Iran’s nuclear facilities,77 the Obama 
administration’s classified “kill list,”78 a double-agent in 
Yemen,79 and information relating to the bin Laden raid.80  
Moreover, the concern has become even greater as Americans, 
such as Edward Snowden81 and Bradley Manning,82 have used 
their jobs to leak some of the country’s most sensitive 
intelligence information.83  These latest leaks have sparked 
government officials’ attention with a focus on reform.84  
Specifically, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California), 
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
declared, “the culture of leaks has to change.”85 
 
Probe, WIRED (June 6, 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/stuxnet-leak-
investigation/ (discussing that Stuxnext was a cyber-attack created as a “joint project of 
the U.S. and Israel, and that the worm that escaped its prescribed target after the 
Israelis made unspecified alterations to it.  The spread of the worm ultimately led to its 
discovery by a computer security firm in Belarus in June 2010.”).  
 77.  Evan Perez & Adam Entous, FBI Probes Leaks on Iran Cyberattack, WALL ST. 
J. (June 5, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303506404577448563 
517340188.html (discussing disclosure of a cyber-attack aimed at Iran’s nuclear 
facilities).   
 78.  Jeremy Herb, Senate Democrats Blast National Security Leak About 
Cyberattack Against Iran, HILL BLOG (June 5, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-
hill/policy-and-strategy/230985-senate-dems-blast-leaks-about-iranian-cyberattacks. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Elise Cooper, Political Leaks, AMERICAN THINKER BLOG (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/10/political_leaks.html. 
 81.  Ashley Fantz, Is the Snowden case Manning, Part II? Not quite, experts say, 
CNN (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/01/us/snowden-manning/ (“United 
States Army Pvt. Bradley Manning leaked hundreds of thousands of classified 
documents about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and sensitive correspondence 
written by U.S. diplomats—information that WikiLeaks published. Some of that 
information was also analyzed and reported by The New York Times, Der Spiegel and 
The Guardian newspapers as well as other news outlets.”).  
 82.  Id. (“Edward Snowden, a former CIA employee and National Security Agency 
contract employee, told a Guardian journalist that the NSA was operating classified 
surveillance programs that track cell phone calls and monitor the e-mail and Internet 
traffic of virtually all Americans. To tell his story, he left his job and life in Hawaii, fled 
to China and is now in Russia, where he has been granted temporary asylum.”). 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Press Release, U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Feinstein, Chambliss 
Announce Committee Approval of Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Authorization (July 25, 
2012), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=337333. 
 85.  Id.  
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II: THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
2013 
A. History and Purpose of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2013 
A Congressional oversight committee enacted the first 
Intelligence Authorization Act in 1978 to give Congress the 
“ultimate oversight hammer-control over the Intelligence 
Community’s purse strings.”86  By contrast, Senator Feinstein 
in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence proposed the 
Senate’s version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2013 after frustrations over recent media reports 
that disclosed key details of the nation’s counterterrorism 
operations.87  Members of the Committee opined that each 
unauthorized disclosure puts American lives at risk, makes it 
more difficult to recruit assets, strains the trust of partners, 
and threatens imminent and irreparable damage to national 
security, especially at a time where there are constant, 
rapidly emerging threats.88  George Little, Pentagon Press 
Secretary, confirmed the purpose of the bill at a July 24, 2012 
Department of Defense News Briefing, asserting that its 
provisions were not an attempt to go after the media, but 
rather to protect classified information.89  Supporters argued 
the bill advanced the government’s obligation to protect 
classified information and national security.90 
Proponents of the bill claimed that it would safeguard the 
nation and protect its citizens91  by preventing leaks of 
 
 86.  James S. Van Wagenen, A Review of Congressional Oversight, CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Apr. 14, 2007, 04:51 PM), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-
for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/97unclass/wagenen 
.html. 
 87.  Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, Feinstein, Chambliss, Rogers, Ruppersberger Deplore Leaks of Classified 
National Security Information (June 6, 2012), http://intelligence.house.gov/press-
release/feinstein-chambliss-rogers-ruppersberger-deplore-leaks-classified-national-
security. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Transcript of DOD News Briefing with George Little from the Pentagon, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEFENSE (July 24, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx? 
transcriptid=5085. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein Announces Committee 
Approval of Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Authorization (July 25, 2012), 
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classified information, which “can disrupt intelligence 
operations, threaten the lives of intelligence officers and 
assets, and make foreign partners less likely to work with 
[the United States].”92  The two provisions at issue in this 
Comment, §§ 505 and 506, were said to give the intelligence 
community the resources it needs in order to do its job of 
protecting the public and the country.93  In light of the recent 
surge of national security leaks that have occurred during the 
Obama administration, these changes are demanded by those 
who support leak reform.94 
The controversial provisions at the core of this Comment 
originated in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s 
version of the bill, encompassing Title V: Preventing 
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information.  The bill 
was introduced by Senator Feinstein and passed the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence on July 24, 2012 by a vote of 
14-1 with bipartisan support.95  The sole dissenter, Senator 
Ron Wyden (D-Oregon), opposed the bill because its 
provisions “threaten[ed] to encroach upon the freedom of the 
press”96 and would “damage the news media’s ability to report 
on national security issues.”97 
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 
Title V contained eleven provisions,98 several of which 
aimed to disrupt the flow of classified information to the press 
 
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=d330ad36-865a-
47b2-81e6-7e60e5ef3c5d. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. 
 95.  Press Release, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein Announces Committee 
Approval of Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Authorization (July 25, 2012), 
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=d330ad36-865a-
47b2-81e6-7e60e5ef3c5d. By contrast, the House of Representatives’ version did not 
include any amendments dealing with unauthorized disclosures. See H.R. 5743, 112th 
Cong. (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112hr5743rfs/pdf/BILLS-112hr5743rfs.pdf. 
 96.  Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Places Hold on Intelligence 
Authorization Bill (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-
releases/wyden-places-hold-on-intelligence-authorization-bill-. 
 97.  Id.  
 98.   Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, S. 3454, 112th Cong. §§ 
501-511 (2012) (as reported by S. Comm. on Intelligence, July 30, 2012). 
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and public.99  The pertinent provisions, for purposes of this 
Comment were §§ 505 and 506.  Section 505 dealt with the 
prohibition on certain individuals serving as consultants.  
Section 506 dealt with limitations on persons authorized to 
communicate with the media. 
C. § 505: Prohibition on Certain Individuals Serving as 
Consultants 
Section 505 “prohibit[s] certain persons possessing an 
active security clearance from entering into contracts or 
binding agreements with the media in order to provide 
analysis or commentary on matters concerning classified 
intelligence activities or intelligence related to national 
security.”100  This section further prohibits those persons who 
had previously possessed an active security clearance for 
access to top secret, sensitive, compartmented information 
from entering into such contracts or agreements for a period 
of one year after their government service.101  The purpose of 
this particular provision, as outlined by the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, was to prohibit the practice of 
current and former employees who have or had an active 
security clearance from appearing in media broadcasts to 
discuss matters concerning classified intelligence activities.102 
D. § 506: Limitation on Persons Authorized to Communicate 
With the Media 
Section 506 provides: “for each element of the Intelligence 
Community, only the Director and Deputy Director of such 
element and individuals in the offices of public affairs who are 
specifically designated by the Director may provide 
background or off-the-record information regarding 
intelligence activities to the media.”103  Subsection 506(b) 
 
 99.  S. REP. NO. 112-192 (2012), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/ 
pdfs112th/112192.pdf [hereinafter Senate Report]. 
 100.   Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, S. 3454, 112th Cong. §§ 
501-511 (2012) (as reported by S. Comm. on Intelligence, July 30, 2012). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Senate Report, supra note 99.  
 103.   Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, S. 3454, 112th Cong. §§ 
501-511 (2012) (as reported by S. Comm. on Intelligence, July 30, 2012). 
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made clear that it did not prohibit an officer or employee of an 
element of the Intelligence Community from providing 
authorized, unclassified, on-the-record briefings to the media 
or to any person affiliated with the media.104  This provision 
did not prohibit an Intelligence Community official from 
providing necessary threat or other unclassified information 
to the public so long as the official was acting in their official 
capacity and was authorized to speak to the media on-the-
record.105 
III: CRITICISM AND RESPONSE 
Title V instantly created a surge of backlash from 
journalists and other organizations across the country within 
days of passing the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence.106  The bill was criticized on numerous grounds, 
some of which will be discussed in the following subsections. 
A. Journalists 
Journalists had nothing positive to say about Title V of the 
bill and instead, many called for its defeat.  The Washington 
Post took a harsh view on the proposed legislation, using such 
words to describe the bill as “crude and dangerous,” “poorly 
drafted,” and “hastily conceived.”107  The main problem 
journalists had with the bill is that it could end present 
dialogues between them and intelligence officials.108  If 
provisions like this pass, these dialogues will have to be 
logged and reported, and as The Washington Post asserts, the 
result will be fewer such conversations.109  Overall, the bill’s 
provisions were a “draconian attempt at anti-leaking 
legislation,”110 that would do the complete opposite of what it 
 
 104.  Senate Report, supra note 99.  
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Mark Hosenball, Senate Intelligence Panel to Reconsider Anti-Leak Plan, 
REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE8721DU20120803. 
 107.  Editorial, A Bill to Stop Security Leaks Puts a Plug on Democracy, WASH. 
POST (July 30, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/squelching-public-
interest-in-national-security/2012/07/30/gJQAF0pHLX_story.html. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  David Ignatius, Editorial, Senate’s Anti-Leaking Bill Doesn’t Address the Real 
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was intended to do by instead creating a counter-intelligence 
problem.111  By interfering with the daily give-and-take 
between the media and intelligence agencies, the “lifeblood of 
a democratic society while trying to solve a leak problem 
[would be impacted] . . . without making the nation in any 
way more secure.”112 
Likewise, Reuters called Title V’s provisions “strict new 
measures” which would stop the commonplace practice of 
journalists occasionally being briefed by intelligence officials 
who were directly involved in the news events under 
discussion.113  Section 505, the provision which Reuters 
believed to be the most threatening, would ban any 
intelligence official, other than press officers and agency 
directors or deputy directors, from giving non-attributable 
background briefings to journalists.114  To end this practice 
would be a radical change from the approach of nearly all 
recent United States administrations.115 
Bill Keller, former executive editor and current columnist 
of The New York Times, commented on the bill’s provisions, 
stating that although the government “has [the] right and 
[the] responsibility to protect secrets whose disclosure could 
undermine American security,” it also has “a responsibility to 
explain and justify what it is doing in our name.”116  Keller, 
like the journalists at The Washington Post, also agreed that 
the added provisions were draconian and asserted that as a 
result, the public and Congress will know less about how well 
the intelligence agencies are doing their jobs.117  Likewise, an 
editorial in The New York Times called the legislation 
“misguided,” claiming that the provisions would impair news 
coverage of national security issues.118  The editorial called 
 
Sources of Information, WASH. POST (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-senates-anti-leaking-bill-
doesnt-address-the-real-sources-of-information/2012/07/31/gJQAPBElNX_story.html. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Editorial, supra note 107. 
 113.  Hosenball, supra note 106. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Editorial, A Pernicious Drive Toward Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/opinion/a-pernicious-drive-toward-
secrecy.html?_r=4&smid=tw-share&. 
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the bill dangerous because Congress drafted the bill “in secret 
without public hearings.”119 
B. The Sunshine in Government Initiative 
The Sunshine in Government Initiative (“SGI”) “is a 
coalition of media groups committed to promoting policies 
that ensure government is accessible, accountable, and 
open.”120  In other words, its mission is primarily dedicated to 
oversight of the government to safeguard democracy.121  It 
claims that citizens have a right to information that is best 
served when news media act on behalf of the public to gain 
access to information.122 
On August 10, 2012, the SGI wrote a letter about its 
concerns with Title V to the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence.123  In this letter, the SGI analyzed certain 
provisions that it found to be troubling and that it believed 
would curtail public access to information about news events 
and what the government is doing in the public’s name.124  In 
particular, the SGI claimed that §§ 505, 506, and 508 
threatened the basic role of the press in the relationship 
between the government and the public.125  It claimed that 
these provisions “significantly undermine common practice in 
reporting on national security issues of vital public interest 
and appear to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.”126 
Section 505, the SGI argued, prevented the news media’s, 
and consequently, the public’s, ability to benefit from a 
present or former government official’s expertise.127  Through 
 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  SUNSHINE  IN  GOV’T  INITIATIVE,  http://www.sunshineingovernment.org/index. 
php?cat=38 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Sunshine in Government Initiative, SGI Letter to Senate Intelligence 
Committee Regarding S. 3454 (Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2013), THE 
SUNSHINE IN GOV’T BLOG (Aug. 31, 2012), http://sunshineingov.wordpress.com/2012/ 
08/31/sgi-letter-to-ssci-on-intelauthfy13/. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. For purposes of this note, the discussion about § 508 will be omitted. 
 126.  Sunshine in Government Initiative, SGI Letter to Senate Intelligence 
Committee Regarding S. 3454 (Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2013), THE 
SUNSHINE IN GOV’T BLOG (Aug. 31, 2012), 
http://sunshineingov.wordpress.com/2012/08/31/sgi-letter-to-ssci-on-intelauthfy13/.  
 127.  Id. 
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their analysis and commentary, these officials assist 
journalists and the public to understand issues and ensure 
the accuracy of the stories’ details.128  These officials likewise 
allay fears during major national crises, such as the 
September 11th terrorist attacks.129 
Section 506 poses an even greater threat to the public’s 
access to information because it would significantly constrain 
the flow of information from the government to the press and 
public on important national security issues.130  The SGI 
claims that this provision would change a practice that has 
been a part of our democracy from the beginning.131  
Government officials and journalists have used background 
briefings and off-the-record briefings to their mutual benefit 
since the founding of our country.132  Both are vital because 
they help journalists understand the full context of the story, 
get key details right, and ensure that individuals or the 
United States as a whole will not be harmed by the 
publication of incorrect or sensitive information.  
Furthermore, these officials can share information with the 
press without fearing for their security if their names are 
published.133 
The SGI argued that careful and thoughtful deliberation 
should be given before enactment of provisions like these, 
which impact the delicate balance between the government’s 
right to keep certain information secret to protect national 
security and the press’s right to gather news and inform 
citizens about what the government is doing in their name.134  
Journalists handle leaks responsibly and follow procedures 
which mitigate any potential harm when reporting stories 
based on unauthorized disclosures.135 
 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Sunshine in Government Initiative, SGI Letter to Senate Intelligence 
Committee Regarding S. 3454 (Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2013), THE 
SUNSHINE IN GOV’T BLOG (Aug. 31, 2012), http://sunshineingov.wordpress 
.com/2012/08/31/sgi-letter-to-ssci-on-intelauthfy13/.  
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
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C. American Civil Liberties Union 
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) “is a 
national organization advocating individual rights, by 
litigating, legislating, and educating the public on a broad 
array of issues affecting individual freedom in the United 
States.”136  On August 15, 2012, the ACLU wrote a letter 
urging the United States Senate to strip Title V from the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, claiming 
that the anti-leak measures would threaten freedom of speech 
and the press and would also violate due process and 
separation of powers.137  Most of the ACLU’s arguments focus 
on §§ 505 and 506 of the bill.138 
  The ACLU outlined various arguments against the bill.  
First, it contends that §§ 505 and 506 unconstitutionally limit 
the free speech rights of government workers and contractors 
in the intelligence and defense communities.139  Second, the 
ACLU maintained that these sections unconstitutionally limit 
the ability of the press to report on matters of public interest 
involving intelligence activities.  Thus, the sections deny the 
public access to information necessary for voters to make 
informed decisions on national security.  Furthermore, the 
sections would deny Congress information it may need to form 
the basis for congressional oversight.140  Third, they argued 
that these sections unconstitutionally discriminate against 
the media.141  Fourth, §§ 505 and 506 unconstitutionally 
violate both the First Amendment and separation of powers 
by prohibiting members of Congress from talking to the press 
about intelligence activities.142  Fifth, the ACLU argued these 
sections unconstitutionally deny Congress and the public 
access to information about government waste, 
mismanagement, abuse or fraud by outlawing leaks in the 
public interest.  Finally, these sections were said to violate 
open government principles.143 
 
 136.  AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/. 
 137.  Letter from ACLU, supra note 28.   
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Letter from ACLU, supra note 28.   
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Overall, the crux of the ACLU’s argument was that the 
proposed bill was an anti-media bill disguised as an anti-leaks 
bill which would “place a Berlin Wall between the press and 
the intelligence community” and should be opposed in its 
entirety.144  The two greatest victims would be Congress and 
the public.  Congress would no longer be able to perform its 
oversight function without access to national security 
information that is disclosed without organization, and as 
such, would be “cutting out its eyes and off its ears.”145 
D. Response to the Criticism 
Only a week after the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence approved Title V and in response to the 
overwhelming criticism the bill from members of the media, a 
Senate panel was established to reevaluate its provisions.146  
The Senate panel, chaired by Senator Dianne Feinstein, 
reviewed comments and criticism and considered alterative 
ideas and modifications to the bill as it moved forward.147   
    On November 14, 2012, however, a public hold148 was 
placed on the bill by Senator Wyden to prevent it from 
passing without a debate or amendments.149  In placing the 
bill on hold, Senator Wyden cited significant concerns over the 
bill’s anti-leak provisions in a floor statement.150  Senator 
Wyden objected to these provisions because they “would 
[have] harmed first amendment rights . . . led to less-informed 
public debate about national security issues, and also 
undermined the due process rights of intelligence agency 
employees, without actually enhancing national security.”151 
 
 144.  Id. at 14. 
 145.  Id. at 14-15. 
 146.  Hosenball, supra note 106. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Reference Home, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term 
/hold.htm(stating that: an informal practice by which a senator informs his or her floor 
leader that he or she does not wish a particular bill or other measure to reach the floor 
for consideration. The majority leader need not follow the senator’s wishes, but is on 
notice that the opposing senator may filibuster any motion to consider the measure.”). 
 149.  Communications Office, What to Know about Hold on Intelligence 
Authorization Bill, SENATOR RON WYDEN BLOG (Dec. 18, 2012), 
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/blog/post/what-to-know-about-wyden-hold-on-
intelligence-authorization-bill. 
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Floor Statement on the Removal of 
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   As time ran out on passing the legislation, the 
controversial anti-leak provisions meant to lessen the amount 
of unauthorized disclosures of classified information were 
removed.152  On December 21, 2012, the only provision that 
remained was one that would mandate the Executive Branch 
to alert Congress when it “declassif[ies] information to 
disclose it to the press.”153  With the anti-leak provisions 
removed, the bill moved forward and was approved with 
unanimous consent.154  However, there is a concern that such 
provisions may be proposed again in the future,155 as the 
problem of leaks does not appear to be diminishing any time 
soon.156 
IV: LEGAL AND POLICY BASED IMPLICATIONS 
Congressional oversight is often seen as inadequate.157  It 
is frequently said that the press is the entity most capable of 
providing oversight of government activity.158  Senator Wyden 
confirmed in a recent floor statement that members of 
Congress do in fact use the media to exercise oversight of the 
Executive Branch, stating: 
And while members of Congress don’t like to admit it, 
members often rely on the press to inform them about 
problems that congressional overseers have not discovered on 
their own.  I have been on the Senate Intelligence Committee 
for twelve years now, and I can recall numerous specific 
instances where I have found out about serious government 
wrongdoing – such as the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping 
 
Controversial Leaks Provisions from Intelligence Authorization Bill (Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-floor-statement-on-the-
removal-of-controversial-leaks-provisions-from-intelligence-authorization-bill. 
 152.  Id.; see also Senate Report, supra note 99; Rick Blum, Diverting the avalanche 
of leaks: a (temporary) win for responsible news coverage, REPORTERS COMMITTEE 
(2013),  http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-
and-law-winter-2013/diverting-avalanche-leaks-t. 
 153.  Id.  
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Josh Gerstein, Senate Panel Nixes Anti-Leak Measures, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 
2012), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2012/12/senate-panel-nixes 
antileak-measures-152684.html. 
 156.  Elise Cooper, Political Leaks, AMERICAN THINKER BLOG (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/10/political_leaks.html. 
 157.  ROSS, supra note 18, at 5. 
 158.  Id. 
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program, or the CIA’s coercive interrogation program – only 
as a result of disclosures by the press.159 
Senator Wyden’s account illustrates that members of 
Congress are dependent on the information they receive from 
the press to make informed decisions.  Provisions like those 
included in Title V would severely impair Congress’s ability to 
act as a check on the intelligence community.160  In light of the 
threat of ongoing terrorism, this limitation is especially 
troubling.161  Congress, however, is not the only body that 
stands to be affected; the media and the public will also be 
impacted by legislation curtailing such valuable oversight. 
Recognizing the media for the important function they 
perform, former CIA Director Michael Hayden stated, “I have 
a deep respect for journalists and their profession.  Many of 
them – especially in the years since September 11th – have 
given their lives in the act of keeping citizens informed.  They 
are smart, dedicated, and courageous men and women.”162  
The media, as Hayden acknowledged, are important to a free 
society and a key to an informed electorate.163  To a certain 
extent, unauthorized disclosures are both justified and 
essential to preserve democracy.164  Thus, any harm to 
national security is generally outweighed by the benefits of an 
independent and informed press.165  The reason most cited by 
advocates of the media’s right to publish classified 
information is increasing public knowledge and promoting 
informed debate.166 
  Justice Potter Stewart epitomized this point in his dissent 
in Branzburg v. Hayes.167  Justice Stewart averred, 
“enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal 
upon which an open society is premised, and a free press is 
thus indispensable to a free society.”168  The proposed anti-
leaks legislation had the potential to completely change the 
 
 159.  Press Release, supra note 151. 
 160.  Letter from ACLU, supra note 28.   
 161.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 5. 
 162.  ROSS, supra note 18, at 29. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  408 U.S. 665, 726 (1972). 
 168.  Id. 
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way that the media can interact with government officials, 
mainly by limiting Congress’s ability to talk to members of 
the press about issues of national security and intelligence.169  
Such legislation seems to threaten the very purpose of the 
media’s existence, and to leave the media unable to report on 
critical matters.  This would undermine democracy by 
denying Americans access to this information that is essential 
to national debate on these critical issues.170 
“At the beginning of the chain of democratic responsibility 
stand the people.  It is the people who are entitled to decide 
the course of the Republic based on a clear view of the 
facts.”171  Thus, in a democratic society, the national security 
interest must be balanced against the public’s right to 
know.172  The term, “right to know,” refers to a variety of 
concepts: the public’s general right to be informed about 
governmental activities and performance; the right to compel 
the government to produce specific information within its 
control; and the right of access to particular government 
proceedings.173  Provisions like Title V “limit a government 
employee’s dissemination of information about the 
government,” 174 restrict the public’s right to know, and forge 
a barrier between the government and the people.175  In 
essence, the public will no longer have information about how 
the government is managing national security issues aside 
from authorized disclosures.176  
  Lack of access to this information will in turn impact the 
public’s ability to make informed decisions about who they 
choose to elect to office and subsequently heighten skepticism 
of government, “for without an informed and free press there 
 
 169.  Jennifer Lynch & Trevor Timm, Senate Anti-Leaks Bill Threatens the Rights of 
the Press and the Public, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 6, 2012), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/senates-anti-leaks-bill-threatens-rights-press-
and-public. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at 161. 
 172.  Lynch, supra note 169. 
 173.  E.E.B. & K.E.M., Note, Plugging the Leak: The Case for a Legislative 
Resolution of the Conflict Between the Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an Open 
Government, 71 VA L. REV. 801, 830 (1985). 
 174.  Id. at 823. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
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cannot be an enlightened people.”177  To imagine a world in 
which these provisions were to exist would be to envision one 
where the Pentagon Papers, the Watergate Scandal, crimes of 
torture, extraordinary rendition, or the targeted killing 
program under President Obama, would have never been 
disclosed to the American public.178  Of all of these leaks, the 
one most frequently cited over the years where the value of an 
enlightened citizenry was perceived to overcome the harm to 
national security has been the incident of the Pentagon 
Papers.179 
In 1971, The New York Times began to publish the 
Pentagon Papers,180 a document that outlined the involvement 
of the United States in the Vietnam War.181  This document 
revealed to the public that the Johnson administration had 
lied to both it and Congress about vital issues of national 
security.182  The Nixon administration took action, obtaining 
court orders to enjoin The New York Times and The 
Washington Post from publishing any articles containing 
information regarding the Pentagon Papers because both 
newspapers had published articles containing classified 
information prior to the injunction.183  The Court in New York 
Times Co. v. United States ultimately ruled that the 
newspapers could resume publication.184  Three concurring 
opinions discussed the media’s role in maintaining an 
enlightened citizenry.185 
  Justice Potter Stewart, concurring, emphasized the 
importance of such enlightenment, stating, “the only effective 
restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of 
 
 177.  403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971). 
 178.  Letter from ACLU, supra note 28.  
 179.  ROSS, supra note 18, at 37. 
 180.  Michael Cooper & Sam Roberts, After 40 Years, the Complete Pentagon Papers, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/us/08pentagon.html; see 
also Pentagon Papers, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com 
/EBchecked/topic/450326/Pentagon-Papers (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) (the Pentagon 
Papers, also known as the Report of the O.S.D. Vietnam Task Force, were a top secret, 
classified government study of the Vietnam War and the role of the U.S. government in 
Indochina from World War II to May 1968).  
 181.  See generally Pentagon Papers, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
reference/timestopics/subjects/p/pentagon_papers/index.html. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  ROSS, supra note 18, at 32. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
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national defense may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an 
informed and critical public opinion which alone can here 
protect the values of a democratic government.”186  As 
previously discussed, restraints on executive power are 
especially important to preserve Congress’s ability to exercise 
oversight due to the rise in executive power.187  This rise 
shows that the country is at its strongest when policies are 
created through deliberative, open, and democratic 
processes.188  Without informed criticism and candid public 
debate providing clarity about the nation’s ends and means, 
our security policy risks becoming illicit, foolish, and 
harmful.189 
Thus, a provision like Title V’s § 505 would cordon off an 
important source of information to Congress.190  The media’s 
coverage of intelligence matters provides vital information to 
Congress in its role as a check against the Executive 
Branch.191  The fact that executive power is on the rise means 
that Congress needs to be even more diligent in its oversight 
of the Executive Branch.192  Past executive unilateralism has 
provoked torture, extraordinary rendition, and domestic 
surveillance.193  This unilateralism not only undermines the 
delicate balance of our Constitution but also lessens our 
human liberties and impairs vital counterterrorism 
campaigns.194  Questions about what can properly be kept 
from the public are entirely in the hands of the presidents, 
leaving them free to declassify selectively for narrow partisan 
or protective ends.195 Congress needs to ensure that there is a 
continuous flow of accurate information about the functioning 
and malfunctioning of the Executive Branch, and the most 
effective way it is able to do this is by its oversight through 
the media.196  Congress can do this by using the tools 
available to them: investigations and crafting careful 
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legislation.197 
Furthermore, § 505’s prohibition on former and current 
government employees acting as consultants and advisors to 
the media could also extend to members of Congress and to 
members of their staff.198  Congress’s responsibilities include 
criticizing abuses by the Executive Branch, and this is 
frequently done through the media.199  Section 505’s 
provisions would thus deny members of Congress access to 
the media and would greatly lessen their ability to exercise 
their oversight over the Executive Branch.200 
Overall, should it enact provisions of this nature, Congress 
will be denied the information it needs about national 
security and intelligence to effectively perform its job.201  To 
inhibit Congress from its constitutionally granted oversight 
function would be to diminish its balance among the other 
branches, and to impair two key allies along the way: the 
media and the public. 
V: DISCUSSION 
Since September 11th, there has been a near decade-long 
war against terror.202  The War on Terror has generated an 
increased campaign to stop leaks of classified information 
from being reported to the media.203  Such leaks have risen 
over the course of recent administrations, particularly during 
President Obama’s administration.204  In light of the nation’s 
history of leaks that have impacted our national security, it 
seems as though this is a problem we will continue to face in 
the future.  As the character and nature of leaks change 
throughout history, adaptive measures need to be taken to 
protect the national security of our country while still 
protecting the free press and an informed public.205  The 
measures proposed in Title V, however, were ill-conceived, 
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hastily drafted, and it is fortunate that they were not enacted 
as a means to eliminate the current leak epidemic.  
“[Legislation of this kind] could tip the balance 
dangerously”206 and the tension between the need for secrecy 
and the democratic requirements of openness and 
transparency will only be exacerbated.  “Congress has 
abundantly passed the buck.”207 
  As succinctly stated by Harvard law professor Jack 
Goldsmith, “there is no perfect solution to the problem.”208  
The leak problem is not one that can be solved with one piece 
of legislation quickly passed through Congress.  The tension 
that exists requires that there be more informed debate 
among members of the public regarding any legislation that 
potentially affects their right to know.  
  Congress must therefore look for ways to help the 
Executive Branch safeguard information that intelligence 
agencies wish to keep a secret.  Legislation that threatens to 
encroach upon the rights of the media or that would lessen 
the public’s access to information for which they have a right 
to know should be critically analyzed and thought about 
before an attempt is made to hastily attach it to a piece of 
legislation.  The Director of National Intelligence has even 
stated that provisions such as these would not significantly 
deter leaks nor would it help protect sensitive national 
security information.209  Furthermore, Robert Litt, the 
General Counsel for the Director of National Intelligence, 
recently informed the American Bar Association that the 
proposals “really would not have any deterrent impact or 
punitive impact on leaks, and might in fact have an adverse 
impact on the free flow of information to the American 
people.”210  Based on this information alone, it is apparent 
that the very purpose which the bill has set out to achieve has 
failed. 
Additionally, in crafting new legislation, Congress must be 
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careful not to limit its oversight function of the Executive 
Branch.  If members of Congress no longer have access to 
media reports on national security issues, they would be 
ineffective in their oversight duties, resulting in the Executive 
Branch wielding more power – an undesirable consequence 
that would tip the balance of powers among the three 
branches.  “It [ultimately] comes down to striking a 
balance.”211 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The act of leaking important information about national 
security is something that has occurred on a regular basis 
since the founding of the United States, and has only 
increased in volume in recent years. Title V of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 included provisions 
that, had they been adopted, would negatively impact the 
system of congressional oversight by prohibiting members of 
Congress from speaking to the media regarding intelligence 
activities.  Congress regularly interacts with the media to 
ensure that the Executive Branch does not wield too much 
authority and does not tip the balance of powers among the 
three branches.  Based on the rise in number of unauthorized 
disclosures, legislation must be carefully debated, crafted, and 
revealed to the media and members of the public, as it may 
potentially affect their individual rights.  “It is important for 
Congress to remember that not everything that is done in the 
name of stopping leaks is necessarily wise policy.”212  Thus, 
Congress must look for a cautious, long-term solution to a 
recurring, long-standing problem. 
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